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Regulating Shadows: Financial 
Regulation and Responsibility Failure 
Steven L. Schwarcz* 
Abstract 
In the modern financial architecture, financial services and 
products increasingly are provided outside of the traditional 
banking system—and thus without the need for bank 
intermediation between capital markets and the users of funds. 
Most corporate financing, for example, no longer is dependent on 
bank loans but is raised through special-purpose entities, money-
market mutual funds, securities lenders, hedge funds, and 
investment banks. This shift, referred to as “disintermediation” 
and described as creating a “shadow banking” system, is 
transforming finance so radically that regulatory scholars need to 
rethink their assumptions. Two of the fundamental market 
failures underlying shadow banking—information failure and 
agency failure—were also prevalent in the bank-intermediated 
financial system. By amplifying systemic risk, however, 
disintermediation greatly increases the importance of what 
scholars long have viewed as a third market-failure category: 
externalities. Viewing externalities as a distinct category of market 
failure, though, is misleading. Externalities are fundamentally 
consequences, not causes, of failures, and all market failures can 
result in externalities. Focusing on externalities also obscures who 
should be responsible for causing the externalities. This Article 
argues that the third market-failure category should be 
reconceptualized as a “responsibility failure”: a firm’s ability to 
externalize a significant portion of the costs of taking a risky 
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action. This reconceptualization would not only more precisely 
describe the market failure but also help to illuminate that 
sometimes the government itself, not merely individual firms, 
should bear responsibility for causing externalities, and that 
exercising this responsibility may require the government to enact 
laws that require firms to internalize those costs.   
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I. Introduction 
The world’s financial architecture is rapidly changing. A 
central feature of this change is disintermediation1—bypassing 
the need for bank intermediation between the sources of funds, 
essentially the capital and other financial markets,2 and firms 
that use funds to operate in, and thus contribute to, the real 
economy.3 By bypassing banks, firms are able to avoid the profit 
mark-up that banks charge on their loans.4  
The amount of disintermediated credit already “rivals” the 
amount of bank-intermediated credit to households and 
businesses.5 The trajectory of disintermediation suggests that 
                                                                                                     
 1. In the financial context of this Article, all references to 
“disintermediation” mean financial disintermediation.  
 2. The term “capital markets” means any market in which debt, equity, or 
other securities are, or may be, bought and sold. JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT 
GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 59 (3d ed. 1991). 
 3. The term “disintermediation” is, to some extent, a misnomer because 
there still may be non-bank intermediaries between financial markets and users 
of funds. Those non-bank intermediaries include special-purpose entities and 
other entities that operate without access to central bank liquidity or public 
sector credit guarantees, including finance companies, hedge funds, money-
market mutual funds, securities lenders, and investment banks. See Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking: Inaugural Address for the Inaugural 
Symposium of the Review of Banking & Financial Law, 31 B.U. REV. OF BANKING 
& FIN. LAW 619, 620 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1993185 
(describing the function of non-banking financial institutions).    
 4. A bank, like any other business, needs to make a profit by buying low 
and selling high. It therefore lends money to borrowers at a mark-up over its 
cost of funds. Cf. Stephen Rousseas, A Markup Theory of Bank Loan Rates, 8 J. 
POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 135, 136 (1985) (“Banks, like non-bank firms, are in 
business to make a profit.”). 
 5. ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., ABSTRACT, SHADOW 
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disintermediated credit will soon, if it does not already, exceed 
bank-intermediated credit. The gross amount of disintermediated 
credit was estimated to be nearly $20 trillion in March 2008,6 but 
was estimated at three times that level—$60 trillion—in 
December 2011.7 A more recent estimate suggests an even higher 
number.8 
Disintermediation is making it increasingly difficult for 
scholars, who are accustomed to speaking in terms of banks and 
bank lending, to agree on financial regulation.9 Indeed, scholars 
often say that disintermediation has created a “shadow banking” 
system,10 but they do not even agree on what that term means.11 
                                                                                                     
BANKING STAFF REPORT NO. 458 (2010), http://www.ny.frb.org/research/ 
staff_reports/sr458.pdf (describing the “rapid growth” of market-based financial 
systems in the mid-1990s). 
 6. Id. at 8.  
 7. See Philipp Halstrick, Tighter Bank Rules Give Fillip to Shadow Banks, 
REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2011, 4:17 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/20/ 
uk-regulation-shadow-banking-idUSLNE7BJ00T20111220 (last visited June 10, 
2013) (indicating that shadow banking is a $60 trillion industry) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 8. See FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING 
REPORT (2012), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_1211 
18c.pdf (estimating shadow banking’s worldwide assets as $67 trillion in 
2011).  
 9. Cf. U.S. Regulatory Fog, FIN. TIMES, June 14, 2012, at 8 (referring to 
the “persistence of regulatory confusion”); Brian Reid, Time to Stamp Out the 
Confusion Around “Shadow Banking,” INV. CO. INST. (Dec. 8, 2011), 
http://www.ici.org/pressroom/speeches/view_11_mmfs_fsb (last visited June 11, 
2013) (arguing that miscommunication is causing regulators to misclassify 
money-market mutual funds as part of the shadow banking system) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); EUROPEAN PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE 
CAPITAL ASSOC., EVCA’S RESPONSE TO THE BACKGROUND NOTE OF THE FINANCIAL 
STABILITY BOARD ON “SHADOW BANKING: SCOPING THE ISSUES,” (May 23, 2011), 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/c_110901e.pdf (last visited June 11, 
2013) (discussing how confusion about shadow banking could confuse regulatory 
approaches). 
 10. This Article does not use the term “shadow banking” with any 
pejorative implications. Cf. FIN. STABILITY BD., STRENGTHENING THE OVERSIGHT 
AND REGULATION OF SHADOW BANKING: PROGRESS REPORT TO G20 MINISTERS AND 
GOVERNORS at 1 n.2 (Apr. 16, 2012) (“[T]he use of the term ‘shadow banking’ is 
not intended to cast a pejorative tone on this system of credit intermediation. 
The FSB has chosen to use the term ‘shadow banking’ as this is most commonly 
employed and, in particular, has been used in the earlier G20 
communications.”). 
 11. Even the scope of the term “shadow banking” is unsettled. See 
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Communication among scholars is critical, though,12 because 
regulators and policymakers are informed by their research.13  
This Article argues that the primary cause of regulatory 
confusion is that disintermediation has increased the relative 
importance of one of the fundamental categories of financial 
market failure. Two types of market failures underlying 
shadow banking—information failure and agency failure—
were also prevalent in the bank-intermediated financial 
system. By amplifying systemic risk, however, 
disintermediation has greatly increased the importance of 
what scholars long have viewed as a third market-failure 
category: externalities.  
That change is critical from a regulatory standpoint. 
Although an important job of regulation is to help internalize 
externalities, financial regulation, which traditionally was 
concerned with banks, focused mostly on correcting 
information failure and agency failure. To the extent financial 
                                                                                                     
Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, supra note 3, at 621 (detailing the 
debate of “whether ‘shadow banking’ should refer to the provision by shadow 
banks of any financial products and services or only to the provision by shadow 
banks of products and services ordinarily provided by traditional banks”). 
 12. Communication should be feasible even among scholars in different 
fields because financial regulation has a common goal: optimizing financial 
markets to enable capital formation. See FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, 
COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 34 (2000) (describing the traditional purposes 
ascribed to financial markets); Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the 
Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 188 (2000) (observing that developed 
financial markets are associated with a better allocation of capital). 
 13. Cf. Cynthia Crawford Lichtenstein, Defining Our Terms Carefully and 
In Context: Thoughts on Reading (and in One Case, Rereading) Three Books, 31 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 695, 695 (2012) (arguing that “any rigorous discussion of 
the need for reform and/or more or less regulation of the mostly 
private institutions that carry out [disintermediated] financial transactions 
requires that we state clearly what we mean by the terms ‘bank,’ ‘shadow bank’ 
and ‘the shadow banking system’”); GROUP OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF 
FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL 
MARKETPLACE 49 (2008), http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/The%20Structure 
%20of%20Financial%20Supervision.pdf (identifying the importance of 
communication between regulators and noting that the President’s Working 
Group on Financial Markets facilitated ongoing and fluid communication among 
regulators providing the backdrop for U.S. financial supervisors to respond 
quickly and decisively to the financial crisis). 
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regulation addressed bank externalities, it focused mostly on 
bank prudential regulation14 and the prevention of bank runs.15 
Disintermediation has made that focus inadequate. 
Prudential regulation does not apply, and as a practical matter 
cannot be applied, to all of the firms that operate as shadow 
banks.16 Additionally, those firms are not deposit-taking 
institutions, so bank runs cannot occur.17 Furthermore, as this 
Article contends, viewing externalities as a distinct category of 
market failure is itself misleading. Externalities are 
fundamentally consequences, not causes, of failures. It is thus 
counterintuitive to speak of externalities as a type of cause of a 
market failure. Moreover, even ignoring that conflation of cause 
and effect, externalities cannot constitute a unique category of 
market failure because all market failures can result in 
externalities.  
Although those errors should be conceptually dispositive, an 
even worse problem results from viewing externalities as a 
distinct category of market failure: it obscures who should be 
responsible for causing the externalities. This Article will show—
contrary to the traditional paradigm of market failure, which 
assumes away government action or inaction as a cause of 
failure—that sometimes it is government itself, not individual 
firms, that should bear responsibility for causing externalities. In 
those cases, good financial regulation requires laws that 
internalize the costs of those externalities.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II.A examines how 
regulatory scholars traditionally view financial market failures, 
identifying three categories of failures: information failure, 
agency failure, and, to a more limited extent, externalities. Part 
II.B examines the disintermediated financial system and shadow 
banking. It shows that, although information failure and agency 
                                                                                                     
 14. See infra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing prudential 
regulation). 
 15. See infra notes 50–54 and accompanying text (discussing bank runs). 
 16. Recall that these firms include special-purpose entities, finance 
companies, hedge funds, money-market mutual funds, securities lenders, and 
investment banks. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (defining the scope 
of shadow banking). 
 17. But cf. infra note 123 (discussing how disintermediation has 
potentiated the equivalent of a bank run). 
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failure remain relevant categories of market failures, 
disintermediation makes it much more likely that firms will 
engage in profitable but risky transactions, though doing so could 
externalize harm onto third parties. Externalization of harm is 
the fundamental source of systemic risk.  
Part II.C of this Article argues that, although externalization 
of harm best fits into the existing market-failure category of 
“externalities,” this is a misleading term for a market-failure 
category. Scholars studying financial disintermediation should 
focus more on the cause of those externalities, which can be 
explained as a type of responsibility failure in which a firm 
externalizes a significant portion of the costs of taking a risky 
action. Part II.C also examines some of the important 
responsibility failures in the disintermediated financial system, 
including the short-term funding of long-term projects and the 
limited liability of investors who manage firms. Additionally, Part 
II.C examines how the concept of responsibility failure could 
inform financial regulation. Finally, Part III of the Article applies 
the fundamental market-failure categories—information failure, 
agency failure, and responsibility failure—to analyze regulatory 
provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act that address financial 
disintermediation. 
II. Analysis 
The central purpose of regulation—at least of financial 
regulation—is to correct market failures.18 The analysis therefore 
begins by examining traditional regulatory perspectives and 
tools, showing how they address financial market failures.19 This 
                                                                                                     
 18. See, e.g., DAVID GOWLAND, THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS IN 
THE 1990S 21 (1990) (discussing the economic theory of market regulation). 
Welfare economists argue that regulation should also include the goal of 
maximizing social welfare. See, e.g., Charles Wolf, Jr., A Theory of Nonmarket 
Failure: Framework for Implementation Analysis, 22 J.L. & ECON. 107, 110–11 
(1979) (“That the distributional results of well-functioning markets may not 
accord with society’s preferences is acknowledged, as is the plausible trade-off 
between efficiency and equity.  In welfare economics the trade-off is usually 
dealt with by considering the relative efficiencies of various distributive 
measures . . . .”). 
 19. Infra Part II.A. 
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Article demonstrates that those perspectives and tools primarily 
address two fundamental market failures—information failure 
and agency failure20—and to a more limited extent address what 
scholars long have viewed as a third market failure—
externalities.21  
Disintermediation can amplify systemic risk, thereby 
increasing the potential magnitude of—and thus the need for 
scholars to address—externalities. Because “externalities,” 
however, refers only to a failure’s consequences, not its cause, it 
is a misleading term for a market failure. Scholars could 
communicate more precisely about the disintermediated financial 
system, this Article argues, by speaking in terms of 
“responsibility failure” as a type of market failure that can cause 
externalities. 
A. Traditional Regulatory Perspectives and Tools 
We can identify traditional regulatory perspectives and tools 
by observing the scholars most involved in studying financial 
regulation. Those scholars can be roughly divided into three 
groups: securities law scholars, law-and-economics scholars and 
economists, and banking law scholars. This division is not perfect 
because scholars often engage in overlapping interdisciplinary 
discourses. For example, law-and-economics scholars study 
securities law and banking law, and scholars in indirectly related 
areas of law, such as bankruptcy and insurance, study financial 
regulation.22 Furthermore, economists study all forms of financial 
                                                                                                     
 20. There is some inherent overlap in these categories. An information 
failure, for example, can contribute to an agency failure. See, e.g., Richard J. 
Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Basic Analytics of Moral Hazard, 90 
SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 383, 384 (1988) (observing that an agent with more 
information about its actions may be motivated to act inappropriately vis-a-vis 
the principal). 
 21. This Article uses the commonplace definition of externalities as 
negative externalities: an uninternalized cost or harm that is imposed on third 
parties.   
 22. See, e.g., Emerging Issues in Insurance Regulation: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 44–47 (2011) (written 
testimony of insurance-law scholar Daniel Schwarcz, Associate Professor, 
University of Minnesota School of Law) (testifying on the relationship between 
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regulation.23 Also, law and economics is, technically, a 
methodology, whereas securities law and banking law are subject 
areas. Nonetheless, as shown below, the division is useful 
because each group—securities law scholars, law-and-economics 
scholars and economists, and banking law scholars—has different 
perspectives and utilizes different tools. 
1. Perspectives and Tools of Securities Law Scholars 
Securities law scholars traditionally analyze issues from the 
perspectives of asymmetric information and conflicts of interest.24 
To reduce information asymmetry, they focus on increasing 
transparency between issuers of, and investors in, securities.25 
They also focus on reducing conflicts of interest between 
principals (such as owners of a firm) and agents (such as 
                                                                                                     
insurance and financial regulation); Too Big to Fail: The Role for Bankruptcy 
and Antitrust Law in Financial Regulation Reform (Part 1): Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 4 (2009) (written testimony of bankruptcy-law scholar David A. 
Skeel, Jr., Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School) (arguing against 
the special treatment of financial derivatives contracts under the Bankruptcy 
Code). 
 23. See Saule Omarova & Adam Feibelman, Risks, Rules, and Institutions: 
A Process for Reforming Financial Regulation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 881, 896 
(2009) (discussing the Geneva Report, a report prepared by a group of 
economists proposing improvements to financial industry regulation). 
 24. ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHS., 2013 ANNUAL MEETING, GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT 
AND THE LEGAL ACADEMY FINAL PROGRAM 12 (Dec. 10, 2012), 
http://aals.org/am2013/FinalProgram2013.pdf; see also 1 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL 
SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION 42, 286 (4th ed. 2006) 
(discussing the central themes in securities law of reducing information 
asymmetry through disclosure and reducing the conflicting interests of 
corporate managers and outside shareholders); cf. Kristin N. Johnson, 
Addressing Gaps in the Dodd–Frank Act: Directors’ Risk Management Oversight 
Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 94 (2011) (“[R]isk management 
reforms in the Dodd–Frank Act attempt to address the conflicts of interest and 
incentives that create enterprise and systemic risks through conventional and 
more creative approaches to securities regulation. Several provisions of the 
Dodd–Frank Act emphasize the importance of disclosure as a method for 
reducing information asymmetries.”). 
 25. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure 
and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 669–72 (1984) (arguing that 
disclosure is the principal justification for the federal securities laws). 
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managers hired to run the firm) in order to improve corporate 
governance.26 
Securities law scholars use disclosure of information, 
specifically by issuers of securities to investors in the securities, 
as the principal tool to increase transparency.27 They also use the 
imposition of fiduciary duties (such as duties owed by brokers and 
advisers)28 and improvements in corporate governance (such as 
aligning executive compensation with long-term interests of the 
firm)29 as tools to reduce conflicts of interest. 
These perspectives and tools effectively focus on correcting 
two categories of market failures: information failure and agency 
failure. Asymmetric information is a form of information failure, 
and disclosure is directed at correcting that failure. Conflicts of 
interest constitute agency failure insofar as the conflicts are 
between principals and their agents, such as conflicts between 
owners and managers of a firm,30 or intra-firm conflicts between 
middle managers and the senior managers to whom they report.31 
                                                                                                     
 26. LOSS, SELIGMAN, & PAREDES, supra note 24, at 286 (describing the 
conflict of interest between corporate managers and outside shareholders); cf. 
Complaint at 2, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (No. 10 Civ. 3229) (focusing on conflicts of interest for large financial 
conglomerates with different stakes in a transaction). 
 27. See LOSS, SELIGMAN, & PAREDES, supra note 24, at 42 (discussing the 
effects of disclosure in market regulation); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 25, 
at 670 (discussing the historic purposes of federal securities regulation).  
 28. See, e.g., Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and 
Investment Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 703–04 (2010) (cautioning against the 
harmonization of fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and investment advisers 
without assessing their respective obligations). 
 29. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without 
Performance: Overview of the Issues, 20 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 5, 6 (2006) 
(providing proposals for making executive pay, and its relationship to 
performance, more transparent); cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and 
Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 304 
(2004) (arguing that shifting from cash-based to equity-based executive 
compensation has enhanced the incentive for managers to manipulate 
earnings). 
 30. This is the classic corporate principal-agent conflict. See, e.g., Bebchuk 
& Fried supra note 29, at 9 (“The arm’s-length contracting view recognizes that 
managers are subject to an agency problem and do not automatically seek to 
maximize shareholder value.”). 
 31. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: 
The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457 
(2009). 
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Securities law attempts to correct that second category of failure 
by imposing fiduciary duties and improving corporate 
governance. 
2. Perspectives and Tools of Law-and-Economics Scholars and 
Economists 
Law-and-economics scholars and economists traditionally 
analyze issues from the standpoint of economic efficiency.32 The 
study of economic efficiency focuses on market failures.33 In the 
context of the financial system, law-and-economics scholars and 
economists identify asymmetric information, a form of 
information failure, as one of the main sources of market 
failure.34  
Law-and-economics scholars and economists also 
increasingly take into account behavioral psychology as a source 
of market failure, recognizing that humans are not wholly 
                                                                                                     
 32. The concept of economic efficiency, the allocation of resources in an 
economically efficient manner, forms the analytical framework of law-and-
economics study. See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth 
Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 512 (1980) (describing economics as it 
relates to the theories of utilitarianism and efficiency); see also Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Framing Address: A Framework for Analyzing Financial Market 
Transformation, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 299, 307–08 (2013) (discussing how 
market changes are affecting market efficiencies). 
 33. See Alan Randall, The Problem of Market Failure, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
131, 131 (1983) (discussing economists’ focus on market failures); cf. IVAN PNG & 
DALE LEHMAN, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 414 (3d ed. 2007) (observing that 
government regulation enhances social welfare by correcting market failures); 
PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 756 (15th ed. 1995) 
(defining market failure as “[a]n imperfection in a price system that prevents an 
efficient allocation of resources”). 
 34. A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (4th ed. 2012), http://www.oxford 
reference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t19.e1927 (last visited 
June 13, 2013) (defining “market failure” as “[a] situation in which a market 
does not operate efficiently.  Factors that may cause market failure include the 
possession of market power by transactors, externalities, or information . . .”). 
Economists use market failure as an approach to understanding the issue of 
government intervention. An alternate economic approach, following Coase, 
relies on the concept of transaction costs. See Richard O. Zerbe Jr. & Howard E. 
McCurdy, The Failure of Market Failure, 18 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 558, 562 
(1999) (critiquing the evolution of the market failure concept as a diagnostic tool 
and arguing that externalities are best defined by transaction costs and not as 
market failures). 
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rational actors.35 Humans have difficulty, for example, 
appreciating unlikely events that could have devastating 
consequences if they occur.36 Thus, in both the Great Depression 
and the recent financial crisis, observers critically under-
appreciated the systemic consequences of a precipitous drop—
unprecedented in then-recent history—in collateral value.37  
Such “bounded rationality” can be viewed either as a subset 
of information failure or as a separate type of market failure. It 
can be viewed as the former because bounded rationality results 
in information failure: people misinterpreting, over-relying, or 
under-relying on information.38 It can be viewed as the latter by 
confining information failure to facts (and thus, effectively, 
confining information failure to asymmetric information 
problems).39 Bounded rationality would then be a separate type of 
market failure because it can undermine comprehension even if 
parties have perfect factual information.40  
This Article does not purport to definitively resolve whether 
bounded rationality should be viewed as a subset of information 
failure or as a separate type of market failure. For simplicity, this 
Article tentatively views bounded rationality as a subset of 
information failure, recognizing that this means that inquiries 
about information failure should focus not merely on information 
asymmetry but also on behavioral psychology. So viewed (and 
                                                                                                     
 35. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power 
and Limits of Law, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 815, at 821–22, 825 (2012) (discussing 
rationality failure in human beings). 
 36. See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: 
Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1366–68 
(2011) (explaining how complacency affects individuals’ behavior). 
 37. See id. at 1367–68 (observing the parallel between subprime margin 
loans as a causal element of the Great Depression and subprime real estate 
loans as a causal element of the recent financial crisis). 
 38. Cf. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos, supra note 35, at 821 
(acknowledging that “[e]ven in financial markets, humans have bounded 
rationality—a type of information failure . . .”).  
 39. See E-mail from John Komlos, Professor of Econ., Univ. of Munich, & 
Visiting Professor of Econ., Duke Univ., to author (Aug. 25, 2012, 10:19 EST) 
(proposing that information failure be confined to facts) (on file with author). 
 40. Cf. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos, supra note 35, at 821 
(arguing that even though it can be viewed as a type of information failure, 
bounded rationality may be “distinct and important enough to merit a separate 
category” as a market failure). 
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subject to that caveat about the scope of inquiry), information 
failure remains the main source of financial market failure as 
seen by law-and-economics scholars and economists. 
Law-and-economics scholars also view externalities as 
another source of market failure.41 Likewise, economic theory 
usually assumes that externalities are a category of fundamental 
market failure.42 The failure is seen as the externalities 
undermining economic efficiency by imposing costs of an activity 
onto third parties.43 Regulation could correct this failure, thereby 
increasing efficiency, by reallocating those costs onto the actor.44 
3. Perspectives and Tools of Banking Law Scholars 
Banking law scholars traditionally analyze issues from the 
perspective of deposit-taking banks. In that context, they focus on 
avoiding bank solvency crises and bank runs.45 Their tools 
                                                                                                     
 41. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 44 (4th 
ed. 2004) (observing that another “source of market failure is the presence of 
what economists call externalities”); Paul H. Brietzke, Urban Development and 
Human Development, 25 IND. L. REV. 741, 763 (1991) (“The Chicago School of 
law and economics recognizes market failures, including externalities . . . .”); 
Brett Fischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 801, 806 (2009) (“Externalities . . . are understood to be an 
important type of ‘market failure. . . .’”); Antonio Vives, Corporate Social 
Responsibility: The Role of Law and Markets and the Case of Developing 
Countries, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 199, 224 n.61 (2008) (“Economists normally 
identify four types of market failure [including] externalities . . . .”). 
 42. See, e.g., KARL E. CASE, ECONOMICS AND TAX POLICY 121 (1986) (“A third 
major market imperfection is the existence of external costs . . . .”); Francis M. 
Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351, 363 (1958) (discussing 
the types of externalities that constitute forms of market failure); Robert Cooter, 
Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947, 957 (1997) (noting 
that “Pigou viewed externalities as a market failure ” (citing ARTHUR C. PIGOU, 
THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 329–35 (4th ed. 1960))).  
 43. See Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate 
Disclosure, and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 411–12 (2004) (“Externalities 
are economic side effects, arising when contracting parties’ actions affect third 
parties, who cannot be charged or compensated for the benefits or costs they 
receive.”). 
 44. See Dana Clark & David Downes, What Price Biodiversity? Economic 
Incentives and Biodiversity Conversion in the United States, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & 
LITIG. 9, 35 (1996) (discussing “Pigouvian” taxes). 
 45. See, e.g., Helen A. Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying on 
Depositors to Control Bank Risks, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 129, 171 (1986) (discussing 
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include the imposition of prudential rules on risk-taking by 
banks, limitations on bank capital ratios, and liquidity 
protection.46 As shown below, these perspectives and tools 
effectively focus on correcting information failure, agency failure, 
and externalities.  
Prudential rules on risk-taking, for example, often require 
banks to engage in prudent due diligence when extending credit 
to borrowers, thereby helping to correct information failure.47 
Prudential regulation also seeks to prevent bank managers from 
taking risks that benefit them more than their banks, thereby 
helping to correct agency failure.48  
Furthermore, some banking regulation focuses on correcting 
externalities as a market failure. For example, limitations on 
capital ratios are intended to improve bank stability, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of a collapse that could harm third 
parties.49 Also, although economists often say that bank runs are 
caused by information failures,50 the regulation most directly 
                                                                                                     
the rational behavior of bank depositors concerned about bank runs). 
 46. See, e.g., Arthur W. Leibold, Jr., Primary and Secondary Liquidity, 26 
BUS. LAW. 411, 411–16 (1970) (discussing liquidity); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., 
The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: 
Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 332 
(2002) (discussing prudential rules to control risks); David Zaring, A Lack of 
Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 108 (2010) (discussing leverage caps for banks).  
 47. See, e.g., Onnig H. Dombalagian, Regulating Informational 
Intermediation, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 59, 62–63 (2011–12) (noting Dodd-Frank’s 
increased due diligence requirements for investors); The Monitor, Bank 
Regulation, 31 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 20, 21 (2012) (discussing the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s proposed bank guidance for meeting 
due diligence requirements). 
 48. See, e.g., Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 46, at 264 (comparing internal loan 
regulations in big banks to similar regulations in small banks). 
 49. Cf. Marianne Ojo, Basel III—The Journey Culminating in the Present 
Framework (Part 1), 30 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 13, 16 (2011) (“As was 
highlighted under the introductory section, the promotion of financial stability 
through more risk sensitive capital requirements, constitutes one of Basel II’s 
primary objectives.”); infra notes 167–69 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Dodd–Frank Act’s capital and similar requirements). 
 50. Cf. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit 
Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 404 (1983) (using the Diamond-
Dybvig model to explain bank runs as a form of undesirable equilibrium 
triggered by expectations based on incomplete information, in which depositors 
(sometimes irrationally) expect the bank to fail, thereby causing its failure). 
Information failures arguably are only part of the cause of bank runs, however; 
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aimed at avoiding bank runs is intended to reduce externalities. 
In a bank run, some depositors panic and converge on the bank in 
a “grab race” to withdraw their monies first. Because banks keep 
only a small fraction of their deposits on hand as cash reserves, 
other depositors may have to join the run in order to avoid losing 
the grab race.51 If there is insufficient cash to pay all withdrawal-
demands, the bank will default.52 That, in turn, can create 
externalities by causing other banks or their creditors to 
default.53 The standard regulatory solution, alleviating depositor 
panic by providing government deposit insurance, is intended to 
reduce the risk of those externalities.54 
4. Summary 
The traditional perspectives and tools of scholars studying 
financial regulation are focused primarily on correcting two 
market failures: information failure and agency failure. To a 
more limited extent these perspectives and tools are focused on 
correcting what is viewed as a third market failure: 
externalities.55 This Article next argues that the disintermediated 
                                                                                                     
even if an information failure initiates a run on a bank, depositors with perfect 
information face the collective action problem that they may have to join the run 
in order to avoid losing the grab race. See infra note 51 and accompanying text 
(discussing the causes of bank runs).  
 51. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk 
Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1156 
(1988) (linking bank runs and depositor collective action problems). 
 52. R.W. HAFER, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 145 
(2005) (observing that a bank’s cash reserves are often less than five percent of 
its deposits). 
 53. See Chris Mundy, The Nature of Risk: The Nature of Systemic Risk—
Trying to Achieve a Definition, BALANCE SHEET, Jan. 2004, at 29 (referring to 
bank runs as the “classic systemic risk”). 
 54. See, e.g., Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Banking Theory, 
Deposit Insurance, and Bank Regulation, 59 J. BUS. 55, 63–64 (1986) (analyzing 
optimal contracts that prevent bank runs and observing that government 
provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts). It might be 
argued that the direct effect of deposit insurance, protecting individual 
depositors, is somewhat misguided because depositors are contracting creditors 
of the bank. The indirect effect, however, is to protect the bank itself from a run. 
 55. Although there are other traditional market-failure categories, see 
Zerbe Jr. & McCurdy, supra note 34, at 561 (describing these categories), they 
do not appear to be relevant to financial regulation, much less to regulation of 
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financial system makes the third market failure much more 
important. This Article also contends that the third market 
failure should more accurately be characterized as a type of 
“responsibility failure”56 rather than as an “externality.” To 
understand why, it is first necessary to understand the 
disintermediated financial system. 
B. The Disintermediated Financial System 
The disintermediated financial system, or shadow banking, 
encompasses financing and financial services provided through 
non-bank entities.57 This includes structured finance and 
securitization, in which financing is indirectly raised by special-
purpose entities (SPEs), including asset-backed commercial paper 
(ABCP) conduits and structured investment vehicles (commonly 
known as SIVs).58 It also encompasses financing and financial 
services provided by other financial intermediaries that operate 
without access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit 
guarantees, such as finance companies, hedge funds, money-
market mutual funds, securities lenders engaging in repo 
lending, and investment banks.59 
                                                                                                     
the disintermediated financial system. Market failures due to monopolies and 
other types of non-competitive markets are not generally relevant to the 
disintermediated financial system. Likewise, the public goods problem—a form 
of collective action problem describing the inability of markets to provide goods 
that, like clean air, are non-excludable and non-rivalrous, since some parties 
will want to free ride on public goods when such goods are (inevitably) 
purchased by others—does not appear to be relevant to the disintermediated 
financial system. 
 56. See infra Part II.C.1 (defining responsibility failure as a firm’s ability to 
externalize a significant portion of the costs of taking a risky action). 
 57. For a more complete discussion of shadow banking, see TOBIAS ADRIAN 
& ADAM B. ASHCRAFT, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y., STAFF REP. NO. 559, SHADOW 
BANKING REGULATION (Apr. 2012); Erik F. Gerding, The Shadow Banking 
System and Its Legal Origins, (Aug. 23, 2011) (draft) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990816; Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, 
supra note 3.  
 58. See Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, supra note 3, at 620–23 
(discussing the scope of shadow banking). 
 59. See id. at 621, 623, 624, 632 (discussing the breadth of shadow 
banking). 
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The paramount concern posed by the disintermediated 
financial system is that it “can, if left unregulated, pose systemic 
risks to the financial system.”60 This makes the problem of 
externalities critically important because systemic collapses are 
likely to cause catastrophic harm to innocent third parties.61 To 
understand why the disintermediated financial system poses 
systemic risks, first consider information failure and agency 
failure. 
By increasing complexity, disintermediation increases 
information failure by making financial transactions and 
products more difficult to disclose and understand.62 
Disintermediation also intensifies information failure by 
increasing decentralization, which makes it more difficult for 
market participants to effectively process information.63 These 
increased and intensified information failures make panics more 
likely. Specifically, they allow risks to accumulate unnoticed and 
unchecked, causing market participants to panic when hidden 
risks suddenly become apparent.64 Panics, in turn, often serve as 
a trigger that can commence a chain of systemic failures.65  
Disintermediation can also exacerbate information failure by 
shifting financing in two ways: from firms to markets, and from 
more formal markets to less formal markets.66 These shifts not 
                                                                                                     
 60. Id. at 625; see also KLARA BAKK-SIMON ET AL., EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, 
OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 133, SHADOW BANKING IN THE EURO AREA: AN OVERVIEW, 
at 4 (Apr. 2012) (observing that disintermediation is “one of the main sources of 
financial stability concerns”). 
 61. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 207, 235 
(2008) (attempting to estimate the costs of a systemic failure of the financial 
system, which could go beyond direct economic costs and include indirect “social 
costs in the form of widespread poverty and unemployment”). 
 62. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH. L. REV. 1109, 1113 (2008) (stating that the 
complexity of financial transactions causes insufficient disclosures and affects 
securities regulations).  
 63. See Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, supra note 3, at 627–31 
(discussing the negative and positive effects of decentralization). 
 64. See id. at 628–29 (discussing Dan Awrey’s observations in Complexity, 
Innovation and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets). 
 65. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 61, at 214 (discussing the 
effects of market panics). 
 66. See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell 
Tolls: The Demise of Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. 
CORP. L. 865, 866, 882–87 (2008) (describing the displacement of traditional 
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only further increase the likelihood of panics, as explained 
above;67 they also increase the potential for systemic risk 
transmission by increasing the system-wide correlation among 
financial firms and markets.68  
Disintermediation also increases the potential for agency 
failure, especially the intra-firm conflicts between middle 
managers and the senior managers to whom they report.69 Middle 
managers will likely know more than senior managers about the 
complex and highly technical financial products that 
disintermediation makes available, making it harder for senior 
managers to monitor middle managers70—especially when senior 
managers rely on simplifying heuristics, such as value-at-risk 
(VaR) models, to assess risk on those products.71 This increased 
potential for agency failure can increase systemic risk.72 
Neither information failure nor agency failure explain, 
however, an even more important reason why disintermediation 
poses systemic risks to the financial system. As explained 
below,73 disintermediation makes it much more likely that 
market participants will engage in profitable but risky 
transactions, although doing so could externalize harm onto third 
                                                                                                     
exchange trading and arguing that the benefits of formal markets can include 
greater transparency).  
 67. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text (explaining the events 
that frequently lead to market panic). 
 68. See Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, supra note 3, at 630–31 
(“Because it uses financial markets to provide products and services and also 
increases interconnectedness, shadow banking might increase the system-wide 
correlation among financial firms and markets. To that extent, shadow banking 
could increase systemic risk transmission.”). 
 69. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (describing that agency 
failure). 
 70. See Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, supra note 3, at 635–36 
(explaining why the complexity of shadow banking, combined with the 
technology that enables it, can exacerbate the intra-firm agency failure).  
 71. See Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse, supra note 31, at 463–
64 (discussing upper-level management’s reliance on middle-management’s 
technical expertise).  
 72. See Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, supra note 3, at 634 
(“Although this intra-firm principal-agent failure is not unique to shadow 
banking, the complexity of shadow banking, combined with the very technology 
that enables shadow banking to thrive, can exacerbate the failure.”). 
 73. See infra Part II.B.3 (providing examples of how disintermediation 
increases the potential for externalities). 
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parties. Conceptually, this is the fundamental source of systemic 
risk. Namely, “systemic risk results from a type of tragedy of the 
commons in which market participants lack sufficient incentive, 
absent regulation, to limit risk-taking in order to reduce the 
systemic danger to others. Law, therefore, has a role in reducing 
systemic risk.”74  
Externalizing harm onto third parties best fits into the 
existing market-failure category of “externalities.” This Article 
next contends, however, that “externalities” is a misleading term 
for a market-failure category. Scholars studying financial 
disintermediation should focus more on the cause of those 
externalities, which can be explained as a type of responsibility 
failure in which a firm externalizes a significant portion of the 
costs of taking a risky action. 
C. Responsibility Failure and Externalities 
1. Defining Responsibility Failure 
Linguistics teaches that language ideally should be 
intuitively clear and precise.75 For several reasons, “responsibility 
failure” is a clearer and more precise term than “externalities” 
when used to discuss market failures in the disintermediated 
financial system. 
As indicated, there are currently three terms that describe 
these market failures: (1) “information failure”; (2) “agency 
failure”; and (3) “externalities.” The first two work well because 
                                                                                                     
 74. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 61, at 193; see also id. at 206 (“As 
a result, there is a type of tragedy of the commons, in which the benefits of 
exploiting finite capital resources accrue to individual market participants, each 
of whom is motivated to maximize use of the resource . . . .”). The reference 
above to a “type” of tragedy of the commons reflects that the analogy is 
imperfect; there is, technically, “a tragedy of the commons only insofar as 
market participants suffer from the actions of other market participants,” as 
opposed to non-market participants. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos, 
supra note 35, at 821 n.22. 
 75. Cf. DAN SPERBER & DEIRDRE WILSON, INTRODUCTION: PRAGMATICS, IN 
MEANING AND RELEVANCE 1, 1–3 (2012) (summarizing two widely accepted 
“foundational ideas” in the study of language use: that it is important that a 
speaker’s meaning be recognized, and that, to promote “conversational 
rationality,” utterances should be informative, truthful, relevant, and clear).  
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they refer to the causes of their respective failures. Information 
failure is caused by information problems—usually the existence 
of an information asymmetry. Agency failure is caused by 
problems in a principal-agent relationship. In contrast, discussing 
externalities as a market failure is counterintuitive and 
imprecise because the term “externalities” conflates cause and 
effect, referring only to a failure’s consequences. 
This Article proposes that, when discussing the causes of 
market failures in the disintermediated financial system (if not 
more broadly), we should substitute for “externalities” the term 
“responsibility failure.” The latter refers to responsibility for a 
firm’s ability to externalize a significant portion of the costs of 
taking a risky action—such externalization of costs being the 
most important reason why disintermediation poses systemic 
risks to the financial system.76 Responsibility failure differs from 
information failure because it does not deal with problems of 
information, and it differs from agency failure because it 
addresses obligations to third parties outside of a principal-agent 
relationship. As explained below, responsibility failure is also 
different, as well as more precise as a type of market failure, than 
externalities.77 
2. Comparing Responsibility Failure and Externalities 
The primary reason to denote “responsibility failure,” rather 
than “externalities,” as a type of market failure is that the former 
term, as discussed, references causation whereas the latter term 
                                                                                                     
 76. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text (detailing the risks 
associated with disintermediation). 
 77. Responsibility failure also goes beyond the failure of actual markets to 
internalize externalities because some of the externalities can be systemic, 
affecting the overall financial system. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 
61, at 206 (discussing the motivation of market participants as it relates to 
systemic risk); see also infra Part II.B (discussing the disintermediated financial 
system); infra Part II.C.3 (reviewing responsibility failure in the 
disintermediated financial system). Characterizing responsibility failure as a 
market failure thus embraces the financial system itself as a “market.” Cf. 
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 61, at 207 (observing that whereas 
“[t]raditional financial risk focuses on risks within the financial system, . . . 
systemic risk focuses on risks to the financial system”). 
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references consequences.78 Scholars who speak of “externalities” 
as a distinct type of market failure are therefore using language 
imprecisely. Economists often recognize, for example, that a 
market failure has occurred if the production of goods or services 
results in externalities.79 The cause of the market failure is not 
externalities per se, however; rather, it is the problem with the 
production of goods and services that results in the externalities. 
The externalities merely signal that a market failure has 
occurred. The language imprecision is not differentiating between 
the cause of the market failure and a signal (externalities) that 
the failure has occurred.80 
There are, however, additional serious problems with 
discussing externalities as a type of market failure. Externalities 
cannot be considered a truly distinct type of market failure 
because all types of market failures can result in externalities.81 
For example, information failure can result in externalities to the 
extent information asymmetries cause “nonmonetary effects not 
taken into account in the decision-making process.”82 This Article 
has also provided examples from the disintermediated financial 
                                                                                                     
 78. See supra Part II.C.1 (defining responsibility failure). 
 79. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 42, at 351 (defining market failure as “the 
failure of a more or less idealized system of price-market institutions to sustain 
‘desirable’ activities or to estop ‘undesirable’ activities”).  
 80. Cf. Mark Sunshine, How Did Economists Blow It (Part 2)?—They 
Missed the Negative Externalities of America’s Limited Liability Society, 
SUNSHINE REP. (Sep. 8, 2009), http://www.thesunshinereport.net/mark 
sunshine/?p=402 (last visited June. 17, 2013) (arguing that although economic 
“theories about efficient markets and logical behavior are pretty good, the 
fundamental application of these theories stinks”). 
 81. See Zerbe Jr. & McCurdy, supra note 34, at 561 (“Market failures are 
thought to occur when the market fails to produce public goods, or inadvertently 
produces externalities, or gives rise to natural monopolies, or disenfranchises 
parties through asymmetries, or creates undesirable income distributions. All of 
these forms are types of externalities . . . .”). There is some overlap between the 
information failure and agency failure categories. See Arnott & Stiglitz, supra 
note 20, at 384 (observing that information failure can contribute to an agency 
failure). This overlap, however, concerns causes of failures. The overlap with 
externalities concerns cause and effect; namely, all causes of market failures can 
result in externalities. Cf. ANDREAS A. PAPANDREOU, EXTERNALITY AND 
INSTITUTIONS 167–69 (1994) (“[I]f externality is simply another word for market 
failure, or institutional failure, . . . the notion of externality becomes 
redundant.”). 
 82. Zerbe Jr. & McCurdy, supra note 34, at 561. 
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system of information failure causing externalities.83 To avoid 
this circularity, some economists have even questioned whether 
“externalities” should denote a separate market-failure 
category.84  
Another problem with discussing externalities as a type of 
market failure is that shifting the attention to consequences can 
obscure what caused the externalities. Consider a firm that takes 
a risky action because it can externalize a significant portion of 
the costs. Focusing on externalities, one may well conclude that 
the firm itself should be considered solely responsible for causing 
the externalities. Focusing on responsibility failure, in contrast, 
would help shift attention back to causation, as illustrated by the 
following example.  
Because the managers of most firms have obligations under 
existing law solely to the firm’s shareholders,85 firms that engage 
in risky projects in order to increase opportunities for 
shareholders to profit may be acting responsibly as defined, 
indeed mandated, by law—even if the effect is to externalize 
costs. In those cases, the government could be viewed as causing 
the responsibility failure by failing to impose laws that limit the 
ability of firms to externalize those costs.86 This sharpened focus 
on causation is important because the traditional paradigm of 
                                                                                                     
 83. See supra notes 60–68 and accompanying text (observing that 
disintermediation can exacerbate information failure, making it more likely that 
panics will trigger a chain of systemic failures and increasing the system-wide 
correlation among financial firms and markets, thereby increasing the potential 
for systemic risk transmission). 
 84. See, e.g., PAPANDREOU, supra note 81, at 99–100 (arguing that the “non-
existence of markets” is the actual market failure referred to as “externalities” 
and that it is “not useful to treat externalities as a subset of market failure, nor 
for that matter as a cause of market failure”); Zerbe Jr. & McCurdy, supra note 
34, at 562 (arguing that externalities should not be defined as market failures); 
cf. id. at 564 (arguing that “a close examination of the market failure concept 
gives rise to all sorts of definitional problems” related to externalities). 
 85. See, e.g., John R. Boatright, Fiduciary Duties and the Shareholder-
Management Relation: Or, What’s So Special About Shareholders?, 4 BUS. 
ETHICS Q. 393, 393–94 (1994) (discussing the duty of managers to shareholders). 
 86. Arguably, the government should be so viewed because it is the only 
entity that, under that scenario, can avert the systemic costs. Cf. PAPANDREOU, 
supra note 81, at 156–58 (arguing that the cause of inefficiency is the failure of 
institutions to “reshap[e] the boundaries of agents’ actions”).  
RESPONSIBILITY FAILURE 1803 
market failure assumes away government action (or inaction) as 
a cause of failure.87 
The term “responsibility failure” thus can help (1) to describe 
the flaws of the disintermediated financial system more 
intuitively and precisely than the term “externalities”; (2) to 
avoid the confusion that arises by discussing externalities, which 
conflates cause and effect and creates circularity with other 
market-failure categories, as a separate market-failure category; 
and (3) to sharpen the focus on who should be responsible for 
causing the externalities. Scholars—especially legal scholars, who 
strive to be precise with language88—should want to use this 
more precise term.89  
Using this more precise term, “responsibility failure,” should 
not constitute a break from scholarly precedent. Specific causes of 
externalities are sometimes customarily known by terms that 
more precisely define those causes. The term “moral hazard,” for 
example, more precisely defines a specific cause of externalities 
as conditions or circumstances that protect a party from the 
consequences of risky behavior (such as insurance or the granting 
of legal immunity),90 thereby motivating the party to engage in 
                                                                                                     
 87. See Wolf, supra note 18, at 112 (“Market failure provides the rationale 
for attempted nonmarket (that is, government) remedies.”); cf. Zerbe Jr. & 
McCurdy, supra note 34, at 571 (observing that certain “markets are inefficient 
not because of any inherent ‘failures,’ but because the government has neglected 
to provide the appropriate institutional framework”).  
 88. Cf. Jonathan C. Lipson, Re: Defining Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1229, 1256–71 (2012) (discussing why precise definitions of financial concepts—
in this case, securitization—are important for legal regulation). 
 89. Ultimately, of course, what constitutes a market failure is largely a 
matter of definition. Cf. Paul H. Brietzke, How and Why the Marketplace of 
Ideas Fails, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 951, 965 n.49 (1997) (observing that “[f]ew 
economists realize or admit that market failures . . . are literally matters of 
definition” (quoting Paul Brietzke, Urban Development and Human 
Development, 25 IND. L. REV. 741, 765 (1991))). Even scholars who prefer to 
continue viewing externalities traditionally, as a separate market-failure 
category, should heed this Article’s central point: any study of disintermediation 
must inquire into the causes of those externalities. 
 90. See BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 710 (compact ed. 2011) (defining moral 
hazard). Moral hazard, unlike responsibility failure generally, contemplates 
that the party engaging in risky behavior be specifically protected from its 
consequences. 
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such behavior.91 Responsibility failure, likewise, is a term that more 
precisely defines a specific cause of externalities.  
There is, in fact, a relationship between the terms responsibility 
failure and moral hazard: the latter is a subset of the former. 
Responsibility failure denotes risky actions taken by a firm because 
it can externalize a significant portion of its costs, regardless of the 
reason why the firm can externalize the costs.92 Moral hazard, in 
contrast, is defined by very particular reasons why a party can 
externalize costs—conditions or circumstances, such as insurance or 
the granting of legal immunity, that protect the party from the 
consequences of its risky behavior.93 Conceptually, therefore, moral 
hazard is a subset of responsibility failure. 
Responsibility failure can also help to explain the nature and 
fragility of the disintermediated financial system. Part II.C.3 
discusses two such examples: (1) a firm profiting by issuing short-
term debt to fund long-term projects, thereby taking a liquidity risk, 
which could cause systemic and other consequences if the firm 
defaults on repaying its maturing short-term debt; and (2) the 
limited liability of investors who manage a firm, making it more 
likely that they will cause the firm to take outsized risks in order to 
try to make outsized gains. 
3. Responsibility Failures in the Disintermediated Financial 
System 
a. Issuing Short-Term Debt to Fund Long-Term Projects 
A significant and widespread responsibility failure in the 
disintermediated financial system is the short-term funding of 
                                                                                                     
 91. See Charles G. Hallinan, The “Fresh Start” Policy in Consumer 
Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and An Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 49, 84 (1986) (relying on the economic definition of moral hazard: debtors 
and creditors that are protected from the consequences of default “could be 
expected to increase both excessive borrowing and excessive resort to 
bankruptcy”).  
 92. See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining the reason that “responsibility failure” 
is a better term for describing market failure). Responsibility failure, for 
example, includes matters like short-term funding of long-term projects that are 
unrelated to moral hazard but nevertheless allow firms to externalize costs. 
 93. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (defining moral hazard). 
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long-term projects.94 ABCP conduits95 and SIVs96 routinely issue 
short-term commercial paper, for example, to fund long-term 
projects (usually by funding long-term loans or investing in 
financial assets having long-term maturities).97 Money-market 
mutual funds also provide short-term loans, essentially 
withdrawable on demand, to fund long-term projects.98 
Additionally, repo lending by securities lenders99 is almost always 
short term.100 The driving force behind much of the short-term 
                                                                                                     
 94. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya & S. Viswanathan, Leverage, Moral Hazard, 
and Liquidity, 66 J. FIN. 99, 103 (2011) (observing that short-term funding of 
long-term projects “played an important role in the financial crisis of 2007 to 
2009 and the period preceding it”); Kyle Glazier, Bernanke: Financial Crisis Was 
a Structural Failure, BOND BUYER, Apr. 13, 2012, at 2, http://www.bond 
buyer.com/news/bernanke-speech-financial-crisis-structural-failure-1038520-1. 
html?partner=sifma (last visited June 17, 2013) (quoting Federal Reserve Board 
Chairman Ben Bernanke as saying that “a key vulnerability of the 
[disintermediated financial] system was the heavy reliance . . . on various forms 
of short-term wholesale funding”); cf. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, 
supra note 3, at 625 n.30 (arguing “that the instability of short-term ‘money-like’ 
securities is the central problem for regulatory policy” in the disintermediated 
financial system); Martin H. Wolfson, Minsky’s Theory of Financial Crisis in a 
Global Context, 36 J. ECON. ISSUES 393, 394 (2002) (describing Minsky’s theory 
that market fragility grows as debt levels rise and that the proportion of debt 
will increase as firms use short-term debt to fund long-term financial assets). 
Economists sometimes refer to the short-term funding of long-term projects as a 
form of maturity transformation or as an asset-liability mismatch. See, e.g., 
Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, Bank Runs and Institutions: The Perils of 
Intervention, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1588, 1590 (2009) (“Money market funds and 
other arrangements perform maturity transformation by investing in long-term 
assets while offering investors the ability to withdraw funds on demand.”). 
 95. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (explaining the role of ABCP 
conduits in the financial system). 
 96. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (describing the role of SPEs 
in the financial system). 
 97. The business model of ABCP conduits and SIVs is very similar to that 
of banks in that they borrow short-term and lend long-term. See, e.g., Structured 
Investment Vehicle Definition, MONEYTERMS.CO.UK, http://moneyterms.co.uk/siv/ 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2013) (discussing the business model of SIVs). 
 98. See Bryan J. Noeth, et al., Is Shadow Banking Really Banking?, 19 
REGIONAL ECONOMIST 8, 9 (2011) (describing the use of money market mutual 
funds to “provide short term loans that are essentially withdrawable on 
demands”). 
 99. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (explaining that repo lending 
is a well known form of shadow banking). 
 100. Cf. infra notes 106–08 and accompanying text (discussing how short-
term repo lending increased systemic risk). 
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funding of long-term projects is the reality that the interest rate 
on short-term debt is usually lower than that on long-term debt 
because, other things being equal, it is easier to assess an 
obligor’s ability to repay in the short term than in the long 
term.101 
Short-term funding of long-term projects can be efficient so 
long as the firm issuing the short-term debt will be able to “roll 
over” that debt (i.e., repay its maturing short-term debt from the 
proceeds of newly borrowed short-term debt), if needed. The 
traditional business of banking, for example, is to borrow on a 
short-term basis from depositors and use the proceeds to make 
long-term loans to bank customers.102 
The problem, however, is that a bank or any other firm 
issuing the short-term debt takes an inherent liquidity risk on 
whether it will be able to roll over that debt.103 If the firm 
becomes unable to roll over the debt, the firm may have to 
default, which could trigger a broader, systemic collapse.104 The 
result is a responsibility failure: a firm that profits by issuing 
short-term debt might intentionally want to take such a liquidity 
                                                                                                     
 101. Short-term interest rates may also be lower than long-term rates 
because the term structure of interest rates (also known as the yield curve) is 
usually increasing despite the fact that it represents the risk-free rate for 
various horizons. See E-mail from Simon Gervais, Associate Professor of 
Finance, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, to author (Apr. 14, 2012, 
08:51 EST) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 102. Cf. infra Part II.C.4 (explaining how bank runs, resulting from this 
short-term borrowing to make long-term loans, are related to responsibility 
failures). 
 103. If investors in short-term funding fully understand the rollover risk, 
they may demand that it be priced into the firm’s cost—e.g., charging the firm 
an incrementally higher interest rate, or conditioning their funding on the firm 
purchasing a liquidity facility (which would facilitate the rollover if the firm is 
unable to do so). Because of asymmetric information between the firm and its 
investors, however, the investors may not fully understand that risk. 
 104. See Schwarcz, A Framework for Analyzing Financial Market 
Transformation, supra note 32, at 311 (stating that firms sometimes “prefer 
cheaper short-term funding even though that potentiates a liquidity 
discontinuity—that the firm will be unable to ‘roll over’ the short-term debt by 
borrowing new debt to repay the maturing debt”); cf. Mundy, supra note 53, at 
29 (discussing the systemic consequences of a bank being unable to pay its 
short-term obligations to depositors); see also supra text accompanying note 53. 
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risk, even if it has perfect information about the risk, because 
much of the harm of a systemic collapse would be externalized.105 
The reality can be catastrophic. Economists Gary Gorton and 
Andrew Metrick have argued, for example, that securities lenders 
engaging in short-term repo lending have vastly increased 
systemic risk.106 The “epicenter” of the recent financial crisis, 
they also contend, was the precipitous decline in value of 
mortgage-backed securities used as collateral for short-term repo 
loans which prompted repo lenders to demand additional 
collateral.107 These demands forced repo-borrowers to sell assets 
to generate the additional collateral.108 These forced asset sales 
further depressed asset prices, creating a shock that spread 
rapidly through the interconnected financial system.109 Similarly, 
                                                                                                     
 105. Cf. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 61, at 206 (observing that a 
market participant may engage in a profitable but risky transaction even 
though doing so could increase systemic risk, since much of the harm from a 
possible systemic collapse would be externalized onto other market participants 
as well as onto ordinary citizens impacted by an economic collapse). 
 106. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking 
System, at 1 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676947 (discussing sale and 
repurchase (repo) agreements in the context of the financial crisis of 2007–
2009).  
 107. See id. at 15 (describing the “epicenter” of the financial crisis as the 
“sale and repurchase market, the market for asset-backed commercial paper, 
and MMMFs”); cf. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the 
Run on Repo, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 425, 431–36 (2012) (arguing that these demands 
were caused primarily by opacity about the exposure of different borrowers to 
the flagging real estate market and the value of borrowers’ collateral in the 
event of defaults). 
 108. See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 106, at 15 (“The panic occurred when 
depositors in repo banks feared that one or more banks might fail and they 
would have to sell the collateral in the market to recover their money.”).   
 109. See id. at 15–16 (observing that SIVs relied on short-term debt to 
finance purchases of asset-backed securities and that money-market mutual 
funds were forced to liquidate assets to repay panicked investors who redeemed 
their shares). I have made similar arguments in the article Regulating 
Complexity in Financial Markets. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating 
Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 232–33 (2009) 
(discussing information uncertainty through the example of mark-to-market 
accounting and margin calls by broker-dealers); cf. Dan Awrey, Complexity, 
Innovation and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 401, 413–14 (2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1916649 (arguing that by increasing decentralization, disintermediation 
creates market fragmentation, interconnectedness, and opacity, making 
financial markets especially susceptible to endogenous shocks, such as panics). 
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Federal Reserve Board economists have claimed that the inability 
of many ABCP conduits to roll over their short-term commercial 
paper in the last five months of 2007 “played a central role in 
transforming concerns about the credit quality of mortgage-
related assets into a global financial crisis.”110 The European 
Central Bank also has identified short-term funding of long-term 
projects as “a major amplification mechanism in situations of 
stress,” which can particularly “foster systemic risks . . . if [it] 
takes place outside the regulated [financial] system.”111 
b. The Limited Liability of Investors Who Manage Firms 
The limited liability of investors who manage firms in the 
disintermediated financial system is another important source of 
responsibility failure that can lead to externalities.112 Limited 
liability means that investors in firms are not financially 
responsible for liabilities of their firms.113 As a result, the 
interests of investors may conflict with the interests of their firms 
and, more importantly for externalities, with the interests of 
third parties harmed by their firms. Specifically, even if a firm 
ultimately becomes liable for the externalized harm, the limited-
liability investors will not become liable.114 
                                                                                                     
 110. Daniel Covitz, Nellie Liang & Gustavo Suarez, The Evolution of a 
Financial Crisis: Panic in the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market 1 (Fed. 
Reserve Bd. Fin. and Discussion Series, Working Paper #2009‐36, 2009), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200936/200936pap.pdf. 
 111. KLARA BAKK-SIMON ET AL., supra note 60, at 24. 
 112. Cf. Edouard Challe, Benoit Mojon & Xavier Ragot, Equilibrium Risk 
Shifting and Interest Rate in an Opaque Financial System, ECOLE 
POLYTECHNIQUE, CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIC, Sept. 2012, at 
6, http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/72/89/28/PDF/2012-19.pdf (noting that 
systemic risk arises partially because limited liability increases intermediaries’ 
risk tolerance). 
 113. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 997 (9th ed. 2009) (defining limited 
liability as the “[l]iability restricted by law or contract; esp., the liability of a 
company’s owners for nothing more than the capital they have invested in the 
business”). 
 114. This is not an overlap with agency failure. Agency failure goes to a 
principal–agent relationship. Conflicts resulting from investor–manager limited 
liability do not involve principals and their agents; they go instead to a conflict 
between such investor-managers and society. 
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By facilitating decentralization, disintermediation makes 
this form of responsibility failure much more likely. The 
relatively small firms, including hedge funds, which operate in 
the disintermediated financial system are often managed directly 
by their primary investors.115 Because such investor-managers 
typically divide up a significant share of the firm’s profits,116 they 
have strong incentives to take risks that could generate large 
profits. Some risks might even potentially generate such outsized 
profits that investor-managers would gain lifetime financial 
security.117 Yet, if a risky action exposes their firm to significant 
liability for externalized harm, investor-managers would not be 
liable if the firm cannot pay that liability. 
This is radically unlike the management incentives in 
traditional banking, in which the senior managers tend to share 
only indirectly in profits, such as through stock options. Most 
bank profits ordinarily are paid to shareholders.118 Furthermore, 
bank managers are often invested in maintaining their jobs.119 
They, therefore, are much less motivated to take actions that risk 
                                                                                                     
 115. See Stacy Preston Collins, Valuation of Hedge Fund Businesses, 21 J. 
AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 389, 397 (2008), http://www.aaml.org/ 
sites/default/files/MAT208.pdf. (noting that hedge fund managers often have to 
commit a significant amount of their own capital); Richard M. Hynes, 
Securitization, Agency Costs, and the Subprime Crisis, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 231, 
236 (2009) (noting that managers of small banks and thrifts can own a large 
share of their firms’ equity).  
 116. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF THE SPLIT OF PROFITS BETWEEN HEDGE FUND INVESTORS AND HEDGE FUND 
MANAGEMENT BY MERRILL LYNCH & CO. INC. 6, http://www.oecd.org/tax/ 
taxadministration/18474849.pdf (noting that, during the period 1998 to 2002, 
hedge fund managers generally received around 20% of their funds’ profits); see 
also Mercer Bullard, Regulating Hedge Fund Managers: The Investment 
Company Act as a Regulatory Screen, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 286, 288 (2008) 
(noting that hedge fund managers often receive twenty percent of the funds’ 
performance that exceeds a minimum “performance floor”). 
 117. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 
60 S.C. L. REV. 549, 562–63 (2009) (discussing how “super-large compensation” 
can skew incentives).  
 118. See, e.g., Robert Boldin & Keith Leggett, Bank Dividend Policy as a 
Signal of Bank Quality, 4 FIN. SERVS. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (noting that industry-wide 
bank payout ratios on stock had reached eighty percent). 
 119. Cf. Claire A Hill, Is Secured Debt Efficient?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 1156 
(2002) (describing how managers who do not own a substantial portion of the 
firm may be better agents for lenders’ interests because of the “managers’ desire 
to keep their jobs, which depends on the firm’s continuing financial viability”). 
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the firm, such as exposing the firm to significant liability for 
externalized harm. By shifting management incentives, however, 
disintermediation encourages responsibility failure and its 
resulting externalities. 
The foregoing examples illustrate how the concept of 
responsibility failure can help to inform an understanding of the 
disintermediated financial system. Responsibility failure can also 
help to inform an understanding of traditional banking, as 
discussed below.  
4. Responsibility Failure and Traditional Banking. 
The principal concern in traditional banking is the threat of 
bank runs.120 Although bank runs are triggered by an information 
failure,121 their root cause is that banks borrow short-term by 
taking deposits and use the proceeds to make long-term loans.122 
That creates the potential for one of the types of responsibility 
failure associated with the disintermediated financial system.123 
Banks historically have presented much less of a risk of 
responsibility failure than non-banks, however, because banks, 
unlike (at least until recently) most non-banks, have long been 
substantively regulated to maintain certain levels of financial 
responsibility.124 Moreover, government regulation has, for many 
years, mitigated the consequences of responsibility failure: banks 
generally have access to central bank liquidity, ensuring they can 
pay their debts,125 and, at least in the United States, the claims of 
                                                                                                     
 120. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (explaining the basis for the 
concern surrounding bank runs).  
 121. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text (arguing that 
information failure is only part of the cause of bank runs).  
 122. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (detailing the relationship 
between responsibility failures and bank runs). 
 123. See supra Part II.C.3.a. Gorton and Metrick themselves recognize that 
the demands made on securities lenders engaging in repo lending (see supra 
notes 106–08 and accompanying text) approximated bank runs. See Gorton & 
Metrick, supra note 106, at 15 (stating that Groton & Metrick argue that “the 
core problem in the financial crisis was a ‘run on repo’”). 
 124. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 61, at 210 (“Historically, 
regulation of systemic risk has focused largely on prevention of bank failure.”). 
 125. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
intermediaries that operate without access to central bank liquidity). 
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bank depositors are government insured, reducing the likelihood 
of bank runs.126 
The very fact that bank responsibility failure and its 
consequences have been so limited helps to explain why scholars 
studying financial regulation do not normally focus on the 
concept of responsibility failure: they have not needed to do so. 
With disintermediation, however, all that has changed. Moreover, 
whether or not it is caused by disintermediation, the increasingly 
worrisome problem of large banks becoming “too big to fail” can 
also be explained as a form of responsibility failure.127  
5. Summarizing How the Concept of Responsibility Failure Could 
Inform Financial Regulation 
The analysis so far has shown that three market failures—
information failure, agency failure, and responsibility failure—
underlie the disintermediated financial system.128 Information 
failure is caused by asymmetric information and lack of 
transparency, as well as bounded rationality. Agency failure is 
caused by conflicts between principals and their agents. 
Responsibility failure is caused by a firm’s ability to externalize a 
significant portion of the costs of taking a risky action. Part III of 
                                                                                                     
 126. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (explaining the role of 
government deposit insurance and its effect on depositors). 
 127. See infra Part III.C (explaining the “too big to fail” rationale). 
 128. I derived these market failures by examining the tools and perspectives 
of scholars studying regulation of the financial system and then analyzing how 
disintermediation has changed the system. As a reality check, I thereafter 
compared how these market failures correlate with a separate conceptual 
framework that I independently derived to normatively analyze financial 
regulation. That conceptual framework is based on four market failures that 
could impair efficiency—information failure (due to complexity), rationality 
failure (due to human bounded rationality), principal–agent failure, and 
incentive failure—as well as a type of tragedy of the commons in which 
individual market actors have incentives to engage in systemically risky 
activities because they can profit individually while externalizing some of the 
cost. See generally Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos, supra note 35 
(explaining these market failures). The market failures discussed in this Article 
appear to correlate well to that conceptual framework. Information failure in 
this Article correlates to information failure and rationality failure in that 
framework; agency failure in this Article correlates to principal–agent failure in 
that framework; and responsibility failure in this Article correlates to incentive 
failure and the type of tragedy of the commons in that framework. 
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this Article next applies these market failures to the Dodd–Frank 
Act, showing how they can help to explain and analyze its 
provisions.  
Before doing that, however, it may be helpful to summarize 
how the concept of responsibility failure can generally inform 
financial regulation.129 First, as previously discussed,130 the fact 
that a firm takes a risky action because it is able to externalize a 
significant portion of the costs does not necessarily mean that the 
firm itself should be considered the sole responsible party. By 
engaging in risky projects, firms may be acting as mandated by 
law on behalf of their shareholders, even if the effect is to 
externalize costs. The government should have a responsibility to 
consider changing the law, as may be appropriate, to limit the 
ability of firms to externalize those costs or to modify the 
governance standards.131 Similarly, the fact that investors who 
                                                                                                     
 129. In a recent speech at American University’s Washington College of 
Law, I also discussed how the concept of responsibility failure could help to 
inform how transactional lawyers should address the potential systemic 
consequences of their client’s actions. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Lawyers 
in the Shadows: The Transactional Lawyer in a World of Shadow Banking, 63 
AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
 130. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text (discussing the role that 
the government plays in incentivizing risky externalization of costs). 
 131. Possible regulatory approaches might, for example, include the 
following: expanding oversight liability of directors who take inappropriate 
business risks, see Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-Management 
Failures at Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 53–54 (2010) (suggesting 
implication of “oversight liability” when a board breaches it’s duty to monitor); 
imposing liability on shareholders to increase self-monitoring and reduce moral 
hazard, see Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
409, 414, 446 (2012) (stating that “[e]lective shareholder liability resolves the 
impasse by allowing SIFIs to make . . . costs concrete”); delimiting limited 
liability for investment firms, as advocated by Conti-Brown, see id. at 459–60 
(arguing that the successful operation of investment banks as partnerships until 
late in the 20th century suggests that limited liability may not be needed); and 
as further advocated by Patrick M. Wilson, see Patrick M. Wilson, Protecting 
Investors from Their Investments: Encouraging States to Make Assets in 
Domestic Asset Protection Trusts Available to Creditors Who Have Successfully 
Pierced the Corporate Veil, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 791, 795 (2010) (urging states 
with domestic asset protection trust laws for corporate officers to “allow access 
to those trust assets to satisfy victims’ judgments against corporate officers 
when said victims have successfully pierced the corporate veil and demonstrated 
the irresponsible, if not illegal, behavior of corporate officers”). There are, of 
course, counterarguments to these types of regulatory approaches, such as the 
extent to which they might undermine the business judgment rule and the 
policies behind the rule (such as keeping courts from judging business decisions 
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manage firms in the disintermediated financial system take 
outsized risks because limited liability protects them from 
responsibility for losses132 does not necessarily mean that such 
investor-managers should be considered the sole responsible 
parties. The government should also have a responsibility to 
consider modifying limited liability in order to produce more 
socially-optimal firm governance.133 
Second, this Article does not suggest that all potential 
externalities should necessarily be internalized. The law 
generally does not require that all externalities be internalized.134 
At the very least, though, government should consider requiring 
systemic externalities to be internalized because they are the 
externalities most likely to cause widespread and serious harm.135 
By cutting across markets, systemic externalities are also the 
externalities most likely to undermine the ability of multiple 
markets to maintain accurate and transparent pricing.136 
                                                                                                     
through hindsight-biased lenses, and allowing managers and directors to take 
the risks necessary for maximizing shareholder value). See, e.g., In re Citigroup 
Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 123–24 (Del. Ch. 2009) (discussing 
plaintiff’s attempt to hold directors personally liable for exposing plaintiff to risk 
in the subprime mortgage market); Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Initial 
Reflections on an Evolving Standard: Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors 
and Officers in Germany and the United States, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1433, 
1440–41, 1449 & n.56 (2010) (exploring benefits of risk in investment). 
 132. See supra Part II.C.3.b (discussing limited liability). 
 133. Cf. infra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing how the Dodd–
Frank Act addresses limited liability). 
 134. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 
20 (1993) (asking what types of externalities the law should require to be 
internalized).  
 135. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 61, at 206 (discussing market 
participants’ hesitance to internalize externalities themselves). 
 136. Cf. supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text (discussing the 
relationship between asset prices and systemic collapse in an interconnected 
financial system). Because efficiency is often viewed as meaning that prices fully 
reflect available information, see, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital 
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 384 (1970) 
(noting that an efficient market is one in which prices always “fully reflect” 
available information), pricing is sometimes seen as an important proxy for 
efficiency. Cf. Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Disclosure Decisions 
by Firms and the Competition for Price Efficiency, 44 J. FIN. 633, 633 (1989) 
(noting that more efficient securities pricing can lead to more efficient 
investment decisions). 
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Third, because banks historically have presented much less 
of a risk of responsibility failure than non-banks, even though 
both engage in the short-term funding of long-term projects,137 
government should consider the extent to which banking-like 
regulation could reduce that risk for (at least) systemically 
important non-banks. For example, perhaps those non-banks 
should be required to maintain minimum levels of financial 
responsibility.138 Similarly, because banking-like regulation has 
also mitigated the consequences of bank responsibility failure, 
government should consider the extent to which such regulation 
could mitigate the consequences of non-bank responsibility 
failure. For example, perhaps systemically important non-banks 
should have access to central bank liquidity.139 
Government insurance of bank deposits140 might also help 
inform financial regulation of non-banks. Although non-banks do 
not take deposits, there may be a close regulatory correlation 
insofar as the obligation of banks to pay the government to 
provide the insurance internalizes the cost.141 A similar approach, 
such as requiring banks and systemically important non-banks to 
pay for a systemic risk protection fund, could address 
responsibility failure by motivating “those firms to monitor each 
other and help control each other’s risky behavior.”142 This 
                                                                                                     
 137. See supra Part II.C.4 (noting that banks have historically been 
regulated to maintain a certain level of financial responsibility). 
 138. Cf. infra notes 167–69 and accompanying text (discussing the Dodd–
Frank Act’s requirement that systemically important non-banks be subject to a 
range of capital and other requirements).  
 139. Cf. infra notes 154–58 and accompanying text (discussing the Dodd–
Frank Act’s limitation on the power of the Federal Reserve to make emergency 
loans to individual or insolvent financial firms). 
 140. See supra notes 56, 126 and accompanying text (noting that 
government insurance reduces the likelihood of bank runs in the United States). 
 141. In the United States, for example, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation assesses risk-based premiums on its member banks. See FED. 
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., CAPITAL GROUPS AND SUPERVISORY GROUPS, (July 13, 2007), 
http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/ insurance/risk/rrps_ovr.html (last visited June 20, 
2013); see also 12 C.F.R. pt. 327 (discussing FDIC assessments). 
 142. See Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos, supra note 35, at 831; see 
also id. at 829–33 (generally discussing how a privatized systemic risk fund 
could help stabilize systemically important firms and markets). 
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approach could also help to internalize the most harmful 
externalities of the disintermediated financial system.143 
III. Applications 
This Part applies information failure, agency failure, and 
responsibility failure to regulatory provisions of the Dodd–Frank 
Act144 that address financial disintermediation. This application 
demonstrates how these market failures can be used to discuss, 
and even to explain and analyze, shadow banking and its 
regulation.145 
A. Requiring Sellers in Securitization Transactions to Retain 
Unhedged Risk 
Securitization is a significant component of the 
disintermediated financial system.146 The Dodd–Frank Act 
requires sellers of securitization products to retain a minimum 
unhedged position in each class of securities they sell—the so-
called “skin in the game.”147 This requirement goes to correcting 
information failure. Congress believed that securitization’s 
                                                                                                     
 143. See id. (discussing methods to stabilize the financial system). Although 
various other commentators have also proposed systemic risk taxes, see, e.g., 
VIRAL V. ACHARYA, ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. POL’Y RESEARCH, A TAX ON SYSTEMIC 
RISK 3–4 (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/1/1741/papers/ 
Acharya.pdf (proposing a tax on institutions based on their likely contribution to 
systemic risk), valuing and administering the tax could be difficult. See, e.g., 
Douglas O. Edwards, (Systemic) Risk and Taxation, 31 VA. TAX REV. 331, 338 
(2011) (noting possible adverse effects that might stem from Congress’s 
implementation of an “ill defined and poorly measured systemic risk tax.”). 
 144. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–
Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010). 
 145. Because this Article is primarily concerned with communication among 
scholars, it does not purport to critique the substantive merits of those 
regulatory provisions. For a critique of the substantive merits of certain of those 
regulatory provisions, see generally Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos, 
supra note 35. 
 146. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (providing a broader 
picture of the disintermediated financial system). 
 147. See Dodd–Frank Act § 941(b), § 15G (directing the SEC to require 
sponsors of asset-backed securities to retain at least five percent of the credit 
risk of the underlying assets). 
1816 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1781 (2013) 
originate-to-distribute model, under which the originators of 
loans and other financial assets being securitized sell those 
assets to special-purpose entities, creates information 
asymmetry between those originators and investors in the 
special-purpose entities.148 By retaining unhedged risk, the 
sellers’ interests should become better aligned with the investors’ 
interests, and thus investors should effectively benefit from the 
sellers’ access to better information. 
This requirement also goes to correcting responsibility 
failure, albeit indirectly, by addressing the short-term funding of 
long-term projects.149 Special-purpose entities that engage in 
securitization, such as ABCP conduits and SIVs, are significant 
issuers of short-term debt to fund long-term projects.150 The 
retention of unhedged risk should help motivate sellers of 
financial assets to these entities to monitor that such entities 
are, and will continue to be, able to roll over their short-term 
debt.  
This example also illustrates the utility of speaking in terms 
of responsibility failure, rather than externalities, as a type of 
market failure. Responsibility failure helps to focus attention on 
the importance of seller monitoring, which is intended to prevent 
                                                                                                     
 148. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 36 (2010) (stating that the “originate to 
distribute” model “led to significant deterioration in credit and loan 
underwriting standards, particularly in residential mortgages”). 
 149. See supra Part II.C.3.a (discussing fundamental problems with short-
term debt and long-term funding). More direct ways of correcting responsibility 
failure resulting from short-term funding of long-term projects might include 
better standards on match-funding coverage, better internal controls on 
collateral valuation and margining policies, and internalization of externalities 
(such as mandating privately funded systemic risk funds). The international 
Basel III capital accord takes a match-funding coverage approach by 
introducing, for example, a liquidity coverage requirement that banks hold 
sufficient high-quality liquid assets to cover their total net cash outflows over 
thirty days and another requirement that banks maintain minimum yearly 
available amounts of stable funding. See Jerome Walker et al., Reconciling the 
Dodd-Frank and Basel Committee Capital Requirements, 129 BANKING L.J. 627, 
631 (2012) (describing Basel III’s introduction of a global liquidity standard and 
supervisory monitoring”); see also Schwarcz, A Framework for Analyzing 
Financial Market Transformation, supra note 32, at 313 (discussing the 
drawbacks of using short-term funding of long-term capital needs); supra note 
142 and accompanying text (discussing how a privatized systemic risk 
protection fund could stabilize the market). 
 150. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text (explaining the business 
model of ABCP conduits and SIVs). 
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harm (i.e., externalities) that would result from an inability to 
roll over short-term debt. Speaking in terms of externalities as a 
type of market failure could obscure that focus because 
externalities are a consequence, not a cause, of the inability to 
roll over short-term debt. 
B. Compensating Senior Managers on a More Long-Term Basis 
The Dodd–Frank Act requires senior managers of 
systemically significant firms to be paid on a more long-term 
basis. To the extent this requirement more closely aligns 
managerial interests with the interests of owners (shareholders) 
of firms, it helps correct agency failure. 
Requiring senior managers to be paid on a long-term basis 
should also help to correct responsibility failure by minimizing 
the incentive of managers to externalize costs onto society. In the 
long-term, the interests of managers and a firm’s broader 
stakeholders—such as employees, consumers, suppliers, and 
members of the general public—are usually more closely 
aligned.151 Moreover, requiring senior managers to be paid on a 
long-term basis should help, at least theoretically, to reduce the 
deleterious effects of limited liability152 by making it less likely 
that managers will take outsized risks with their firms that 
would limit their ability, if the firm fails, to receive the remainder 
of their compensation. 
Focusing on information failure, agency failure, and 
responsibility failure as market-failure categories can also help to 
articulate and illuminate connections between regulatory goals. 
For example, because managers are generally more risk averse 
than shareholders,153 aligning managerial (agent) interests with 
                                                                                                     
 151. Cf. John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation, 
Relationship Management, and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law, 78 
MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1466–67 (1993) (discussing overlap in manager and 
stakeholder interests). 
 152. See supra Part II.C.3.b (explaining the responsibility failure created by 
limited liability of investors). 
 153. Cf. Henry T. C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate 
Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 277, 320 (1990) (“The manager cannot take as 
cavalier an attitude toward the diversifiable risks of his corporation as the 
stockholder can.”); Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing 
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shareholder (principal) interests can make managers more risk 
prone. A firm that takes more risks is more likely to fail and 
trigger externalities. Thus, counter-intuitively, correcting agency 
failure can sometimes exacerbate responsibility failure. 
C. Too Big to Fail 
The Dodd–Frank Act’s limitation on the power of the Federal 
Reserve to make emergency loans to individual or insolvent 
financial firms154 goes directly to responsibility failure. Politicians 
and regulators worry that the recent increase in size and 
concentration of financial firms155 tempts firms that believe they 
are too big to fail to engage in irresponsible behavior, such as 
making risky investments in order to gain profits and expecting 
to be bailed out (through emergency loans) if they misjudge the 
risk.156 Dodd–Frank’s limitation on emergency lending is 
intended to remove that temptation and motivate financial firms 
to operate responsibly.157 Dodd–Frank’s goal is to make financial 
firms less likely to fail and less likely to externalize costs onto 
taxpayers if they do fail.158 
                                                                                                     
Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 677, 727 (2011) (observing and questioning the traditional belief that, 
absent incentive compensation, managers are less risk seeking than 
shareholders). 
 154. See Dodd–Frank Act § 1101 (providing the limitations placed on the 
Federal Reserve in making emergency loans). 
 155. This Article does not purport to examine whether disintermediation has 
been, directly or indirectly, a cause of that increase in size and concentration. 
 156. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent 
Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. 
REV. 795, 800 (2011) (observing that many economists believed that the 
market’s perception that some financial institutions were “too big to fail” 
resulted in an “unintended subsidy for these institutions because their creditors 
charged them less for capital” and this cheap capital resulted in an incentive to 
take on excessive leverage). See generally Lissa Lamkin Broome, The Dodd–
Frank Act: TARP Bailout Backlash and Too Big To Fail, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 
69 (2011) (discussing this argument). 
 157. See Coffee, supra note 156, at 800 (“In the Dodd–Frank Act, Congress 
responded to this implicit subsidy by insisting that future public bailouts by the 
Federal Reserve of the FDIC were forbidden.”). 
 158. The unintended consequence of this limitation, however, may be to 
make financial firms more likely to fail and more likely to externalize costs onto 
taxpayers if they do fail. See Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos, supra note 
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Dodd–Frank’s limitation on emergency lending can also be 
viewed as addressing moral hazard: by limiting emergency 
lending, Dodd-Frank removes a specific, although contingent, 
circumstance that might protect a large financial firm from the 
consequences of its behavior, thereby removing that incentive for 
the firm to engage in risky behavior. That perspective is 
consistent, however, with speaking in terms of responsibility 
failure because moral hazard is a subset of responsibility 
failure.159 
Finally, as in the previous examples, the limitation on 
emergency lending illustrates the utility of speaking in terms of 
responsibility failure, rather than externalities, as a type of 
market failure. One could discuss the emergency-lending 
limitation as a limitation on externalities, but speaking in terms 
of responsibility failure helps to focus attention on the actual 
underlying failure: the very availability of governmental 
emergency lending can motivate firms to engage in irresponsible 
behavior.160 
D. Improving Disclosure 
Disintermediation can greatly increase complexity.161 That in 
turn can make financial transactions and products more difficult 
to disclose and understand.162 The Dodd–Frank Act addresses 
this by attempting to improve disclosure.163  
                                                                                                     
35, at 831 (“Perversely, the Dodd–Frank Act undercuts liquidity by sharply 
limiting the power of the Federal Reserve to make emergency loans to 
individual or insolvent financial firms.”). 
 159. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text (explaining the 
relationship between responsibility failure and moral hazard). 
 160. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (explaining the incentive to 
take on excessive leverage). 
 161. See Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, supra note 3, at 626–27 
(discussing the fundamentals of decentralization). 
 162. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship 
between complexity and insufficient disclosures). 
 163. See, e.g., Dodd–Frank Act § 1103 (requiring additional public 
disclosures); § 942(b) (requiring issuers of asset-backed securities to disclose 
information on the assets backing each tranche of securities); § 945 (requiring 
the SEC to issue rules requiring issuers of asset-backed securities to disclose the 
nature of the underlying assets). 
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In that attempt, the Dodd–Frank’s primary goal is the 
standard one: reducing information asymmetries between issuers 
of, and investors in, securities.164 To a much lesser extent, 
through its “living will” requirement, Dodd-Frank also addresses 
the bounded rationality aspects of information failure.165 
Because improving disclosure goes only to information 
failure, it does not involve the other two fundamental market 
failures—responsibility failure and agency failure.166 
E. Protecting Against Insolvency and Illiquidity 
Dodd-Frank requires banks and other financial firms, to the 
extent they are designated as “systemically important,” to be 
subject to a range of capital and similar requirements.167 This 
indirectly, and imperfectly, goes to correcting agency failure 
insofar as it minimizes the impact on the firm of actions taken by 
managers that benefit them individually but increase risk for the 
firm itself.168 It also goes to correcting responsibility failure by 
                                                                                                     
 164. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing increasing 
transparency as a way of reducing information asymmetries).   
 165. Compare infra note 171 and accompanying text, with supra Part II.A.2 
(arguing that information failure results from information asymmetry and 
bounded rationality). 
 166. The “improving disclosure” example is thus neutral to the question of 
comparing responsibility failure and externalities as market-failure categories. 
 167. See Dodd–Frank Act §§ 115(b), 165(i) (providing the “enhanced 
supervision and prudential standards for nonbank financial companies”). The 
Dodd–Frank Act directs the Federal Reserve, for example, to set “prudential” 
capital standards for certain large financial firms, including a maximum debt-
to-equity ratio of 15:1. See id. § 165(j) (providing the leverage limitation). 
 168. See Charles W. Calomiris & Richard J. Herring, Why and How to 
Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement, NOMURA FOUND., at 2–3 
(Apr. 2011), http://www.nomurafoundation.or.jp/data/20111014_R_Herring-
C_Calomiris_006.pdf (discussing how the combination of risk-taking fostered by 
incentive-based pay and low capital requirements helped foment the financial 
crisis); Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409, 
452–53 (2012) (discussing Dodd–Frank’s “clawback” rule that allows the SEC to 
recover incentive-based pay from directors and officers so as to make them “face 
the cost of their risk-taking”); cf. Thomas F. Hellmann et al., Liberalization, 
Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital 
Requirements Enough?, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 147, 149 (2000) (“Capital 
requirements force banks to have more of their own capital at risk so that they 
internalize the inefficiency of gambling.”).  
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mandating minimum levels of financial responsibility.169 The 
consequence is that systemically important firms should be less 
likely to fail and thus less likely to externalize systemic costs. 
This example also helps illustrate the utility of speaking in 
terms of responsibility failure; it focuses attention squarely on 
the problem that some systemically important financial firms 
may be inadequately capitalized for their operations. 
Analytically, this is a more precise focus than “externalities” 
because undercapitalization does not necessarily mean that a 
firm will fail or that the failure will result in harm to third 
parties. 
F. Living Wills 
Addressing the possibility that even a large firm could end 
up failing, the Dodd–Frank Act requires systemically important 
firms to submit a resolution plan—a so-called “living will”—that 
sets forth how the firm would liquidate in an orderly manner to 
minimize any systemic impact.170 This goes to correcting all three 
types of market failures. It addresses the bounded rationality 
problem of information failure171 because it forces the firm’s 
managers to think through and more clearly confront the reality 
of the firm’s possible failure; it addresses agency failure (and 
arguably also information failure) because it indirectly motivates 
the firm’s managers to consider how they can better govern the 
firm to avoid liquidation; and it addresses responsibility failure 
by motivating firms to operate responsibly without reliance on 
the corporate reorganization protections of bankruptcy law. The 
consequence is that systemically important firms should be less 
likely to fail, and, if they do fail, they should be less likely to 
externalize systemic costs. 
                                                                                                     
 169. Cf. supra Part II.C.4 (discussing reducing the risk of responsibility 
failure by substantively regulating banks to minimize their risk of default). 
 170. See Dodd–Frank Act § 165(d) (providing the specific information that 
firms must provide in their resolution plan). 
 171. Recall that information failure results from information asymmetry 
and bounded rationality. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (detailing 
the causes of information failure). 
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This example again helps illustrate the utility of speaking in 
terms of responsibility failure, rather than externalities, as a type 
of market failure. Responsibility failure focuses attention on the 
fact that the corporate reorganization provisions of bankruptcy 
law may protect firms, thereby motivating them to operate 
irresponsibly. Analytically, this is a more precise focus because 
the protection afforded by those provisions does not mean that a 
firm will in fact operate irresponsibly or that acting irresponsibly 
will necessarily result in harm to third parties. 
G. The Volcker Rule 
The Dodd–Frank Act also includes procedures for limiting a 
systemically important firm’s right to make risky investments—
often referred to as the Volcker Rule.172 To the extent this 
limitation recognizes that even sophisticated financial firms 
sometimes might not fully understand a highly complex 
investment, it goes to correcting the asymmetric information 
problem of information failure. To the extent this limitation 
requires firms to restrict and be more prudent in their 
investments, it goes to correcting responsibility failure. The 
consequence of the limitation is that systemically important firms 
should be less likely to make risky investments that can cause 
them to fail. Thus they should be less likely to fail and 
externalize systemic costs.173 
                                                                                                     
 172. See Dodd–Frank Act §§ 13, 619 (codifying steps to implement the 
Volcker Rule’s limitation of proprietary trading). Several federal agencies—the 
Federal Reserve Bank, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency—have proposed rules to 
implement this. See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and 
Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity 
Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846 (Nov. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 44, 
248, 351; 17 C.F.R. pt. 255), http://fdic.gov/news/board/2011Oct no6.pdf 
(providing the proposed rulemaking to “implement Section 619 of the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act”). 
 173. It also may be useful to consider how focusing on information failure, 
agency failure, and responsibility failure as market-failure categories could help 
to explain and analyze the final report of the U.K. Independent Commission on 
Banking (often called the Vickers Report). The Vickers Report recommends so-
called ring-fencing, which is intended to protect the “basic banking services of 
safeguarding retail deposits, operating secure payments systems, efficiently 
channeling savings to productive investments [i.e., making loans], and 
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This example, again, helps illustrate the utility of speaking 
in terms of responsibility failure, rather than externalities, as a 
type of market failure. Responsibility failure focuses attention 
squarely on the problem: even sophisticated financial firms can 
make imprudent investments. This invites an inquiry into how 
regulation should improve, and perhaps restrict, financial 
investing, especially for systemically important firms. But the 
fact that such firms can make imprudent investments does not 
mean that a firm will necessarily do so; nor does it necessarily 
mean that making imprudent investments will cause the firm to 
fail, or that the firm’s failure will harm third parties. The 
problem, in other words, is connected only tenuously to the 
occurrence of externalities. 
IV. Conclusions 
By reducing the dominance of banks as financial 
intermediaries, disintermediation has so transformed the 
financial system that scholars—who are accustomed to speaking 
in terms of banks and bank lending—are finding it increasingly 
                                                                                                     
managing financial risk.” INDEP. COMM’N ON BANKING, FINAL REPORT 
RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2011) http://www.ecgi.org/documents/icb_final_report_ 
12sep2011.pdf. The Vickers Report is at least partly responsive to 
disintermediation insofar as it tries to protect traditional bank intermediation 
from the risks of shadow banking. See id. at 45 (“Equally, the importance of 
[bank] intermediation means that it should not be combined with other risky 
activities which are not an inherent part of [such] intermediation.”). To the 
extent ring-fencing recognizes that even sophisticated banks might not fully 
understand a highly complex investment, it goes to correcting the asymmetric 
information problem of information failure. To the extent ring-fencing requires 
banks to restrict and be more prudent in their investments, it goes to correcting 
responsibility failure. The consequence is that banks should be less likely to fail, 
and thus the banking system—including its ability to safeguard retail deposits, 
operate secure payments systems, make loans, and manage financial risk—
should be more likely to remain intact. The above characterization of ring-
fencing is similar to that of the Volcker Rule, and indeed the Volcker Rule might 
be considered, conceptually, as a subset of ring-fencing. Cf. Julian T.S. Chow & 
Jay Surti, Making Banks Safer: Can the Volcker and Vickers Do It? 29 
(International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 11/236 2011), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11236.pdf (comparing the 
Volcker Rule to ring-fencing proposals). Ring-fencing is nonetheless different 
insofar as it could impose regulation that goes beyond investment limitations, 
potentially restricting other business decisions of banks and systemically 
important firms. 
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difficult to agree on financial regulation. Although regulation 
should continue to help correct information failure and agency 
failure, disintermediation amplifies systemic risk, thereby greatly 
increasing the relative importance of what scholars long have 
viewed as a third category of market failure: externalities. 
In the traditional bank-intermediated financial system, 
viewing externalities as a market failure was non-controversial 
because prudential regulation and deposit insurance mitigated 
the externalities. The greater prominence of externalities in the 
disintermediated financial system, and the fact that prudential 
regulation and deposit insurance have little application to many 
so-called shadow banks that operate in that system, now make it 
essential to confront whether externalities should be viewed as a 
market failure. 
This Article argues that viewing externalities as a market 
failure can cause significant regulatory confusion. Conceptually, 
it conflates cause and effect. Externalities are merely 
consequences, not causes, of failures. Moreover, externalities 
cannot be a distinct type of market failure because all types of 
market failures can result in externalities. 
Perhaps more importantly, viewing externalities as a 
category of market failure obscures who should be responsible for 
causing the externalities. In some cases government itself, not 
individual firms, effectively causes the externalities by 
promulgating laws that enable, or even require, firms to engage 
in risky behavior—such as laws that require maximizing 
shareholder value and laws that limit investor liability, 
notwithstanding risk to third parties. 
Viewing government as the responsible party challenges the 
traditional paradigm of market failure, which assumes away 
government action or inaction as a cause of failure.174 That 
challenge is critical, though. For example, we tend not to focus on 
liability limitation at the firm level, simply accepting it as a fact 
of life; yet, as this Article has shown, limited liability can cause 
larger systemic consequences. 
Any financial regulatory inquiry should include an 
examination of whether laws enable or require firms to engage in 
                                                                                                     
 174. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text (noting the government’s 
failure to implement laws that limit the ability of firms to externalize costs). 
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risky behavior.175 This does not necessarily mean that the 
government should change those laws or require those firms to 
internalize the costs of their behavior—that would be a political 
question. But that question at least should be asked. 
  
                                                                                                     
 175. Although this Article is concerned with financial regulation, 
particularly regulation of the disintermediated financial system, at least one 
prominent economist suggests that its “ideas could be applicable to a variety of 
different situations outside of finance.” E-mail from John de Figueiredo, Edward 
and Ellen Marie Schwarzman Professor of Law and Professor of Strategy and 
Business, Duke University, to the author (Aug. 25, 2012, 11:37 EST) (on file 
with author). 
